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RATIONAL CHOICE VERSUS REPUBLICAN
MOMENT—EXPLANATIONS FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS, 1969-73
CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER*
I.  INTRODUCTION
The years between 1969 and 1973 constitute a watershed in the
evolution of federal environmental policy and legislation.  During
this time, Congress passed and the President signed the National
Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970,
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, and
the Endangered Species Act of 1973.  Each of these laws departed
significantly from existing federal laws, and the air quality and water
quality amendments in particular imposed significant compliance
costs on American industry.  Collectively, I’m going to refer to these
major federal statutes as the Beginning Environmental STatutes, or
the BEST.
What best explains how the BEST became law?  I do not mean
here to be inviting a recitation of the particular procedural path each
took through the two chambers of the Congress.  Rather I mean to
inquire as to how our system of government first considered and then
acted upon all the competing interests at stake and all the arguments
made for and against their passage.
Within the legal literature, the conventional wisdom has
concluded that we can rule out one explanation.  The rational choice
approach to interest group theory, which began with Mancur Olson’s
pathbreaking The Logic of Collective Action,1 cannot explain these
statutes, because, as recently summarized by Daniel Farber, its “two
basic predictions are that environmental groups will not organize
* Professor of Law and Public Policy, Duke University.  A version of this paper was
presented to the UNC Law School’s work-in-progress lunch.  My thanks to the participants for
their many helpful comments. Comments on an earlier draft by Michael Munger, Jay Hamilton
and Jonathan Wiener helped improve the final product.  Don Hornstein provided very
insightful commentary on and criticisms of  this paper as presented at the “Rents of Nature”
Cummings Colloquium at Duke University, March 26-27, 1998.  The World-Wide Web version
of this article can be found at <http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/9DELPFSchroeder>.
1. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:  PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
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effectively and that environmental statutes will not be passed.”2  Even
after allowing for sophisticated versions of rational choice, which can
explain how some environmental groups might be able to form,
Farber maintains that the “core prediction of interest group
theory”—“the dominance of ‘special interests’”3—remains.  Richard
Revesz has recently echoed Farber’s conclusion, asserting that the
logic of collective action makes it difficult to understand why we have
any federal environmental laws.4
This conclusion, if sound, ought to have received much more
notice in both political science and legal circles than it has.  Rational
choice has been the hottest stock in the political science portfolio for
the past 30 years.5  During this same period, environmental
legislation has been the hottest item in the changing priorities of
federal social policy, as indicated by the fact that we frequently refer
to the period that began around 1970 as the Environmental Era.
Looking specifically at Olson’s book, the overlap between the surge
in environmental statutes and the initial impact of his ideas about
group behavior is quite striking as well.  The Logic of Collective
Action was first published in 1965, followed by a second edition in
1971, which included a new postscript in which Olson commented
upon some of the significant reactions to the original volume.  Those
dates nearly bracket the crucial period of 1969 to 1973 in which the
2. Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J. L. ECON. & ORG.
59, 60 (1992).
3. Id. at 61.
4. See Richard Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation, A
Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 542 (1997) (“The logic of collective action would
suggest that the large number of citizen-breathers, each with a relatively small stake in the
outcome of a particular standard-setting proceeding, will be overwhelmed in the political
process by concentrated industrial interests with a large stake in the outcome . . . .  In fact, the
logic of collective action makes it difficult to explain why there is any federal [environmental]
regulation at all.”).  See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE 33
(1997) (“According to interest group theory, groups representing such diffuse interests as those
‘concerned about the environment’ should never form, much less be effective.”); Peter H.
Schuck, Against (and for) Madison: An Essay in Praise of Factions, 15 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
553, 566 (1997) (The fact that “public interest” groups, including environmental interest
groups, “proliferated and prospered” in the 1960s and 1970s constitutes a “major predictive
failure of the new public choice theorists,” who “predicted that such interests either would be
unable to mobilize and sustain themselves as organizational entities or, once established, would
be politically impotent.”).  Schuck cites OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra
note 1, as the “classic account” of this erroneous prediction.  Id. at n. 55.
5. Legal scholars did not begin acquiring significant equity positions in rational choice
theory until the late 1980s, but since then its impact has been tremendous, influencing
scholarship in areas of constitutional law, statutory interpretation and theories of judicial
review, among others.
Fall 1998] RATIONAL CHOICE VERSUS REPUBLICAN MOMENT 31
Congress was enacting the BEST.  Yet in the 1971 postscript Olson
made no notice of the fact that his new approach to group behavior
was just then being disproved in Washington, only a few miles down
the road from where he was writing in College Park, Maryland.
If the rational choice approach cannot explain the BEST, what
approach might do better?  I have not made a systematic review of
the vast number of works written within the pro-environment
community in the past thirty years.  Nevertheless, it seems
undeniable that those who broadly support the BEST and subsequent
environmental quality legislation overwhelmingly favor the view that
the BEST must be understood as instances in which the country
deliberated over what principles were necessary for the common
good or were otherwise morally required.  Farber, for example,
argues that environmental laws are best understood as the product of
a “republican moment,” defined as a period characterized by “(a)
widespread public participation, taking the form of social movements
and voluntary associations; and (b) utilizing a moral discourse
appealing to concepts of the common good.”6
This republican moment explanation constitutes one variant of a
group of theories of republicanism and deliberative democracy that
have been extensively studied in recent years.7  As applied to the
6. Farber, supra note 2, at 66.  (Professor Farber borrows this definition from James
Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American Constitution
Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 311 (1990)).
Other distinguished environmental scholars share the view that environmental law
predominantly reflects moral or other-regarding values, not selfish ones. Mark Sagoff, for
instance, argues that:
 One reason for [our environmental laws] is that Americans have moral convictions
about the environment . . . .  Private and public preferences . . . belong to different
logical categories. Public ‘preferences’ do not involve desires or wants, but opinions or
beliefs.  They express what a person believes is best or right for the community or
group as a whole.
Mark Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1393, 1398, 1411
(1981).  Although speaking about content, not causes, Don Hornstein has claimed:
For all its ungainliness, the substance of modern environmental law is a composite of
moral decisions—about the levels of protection to be accorded such noncommodity
values as human health, aesthetics, and responsibility toward nonhuman species and
ecosystems—and instrumental decisions about the best way to achieve these morally
based goals.
Donald Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk
Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 631 (1992).
7. Republican moment accounts are distinctive in that they interpret American history as
punctuated by periods in which our politics has operated according to the republican tradition
of deliberation and consensus, surrounded by times of  everyday, ordinary politics when it does
not.  Because the results of republican moments arise out of these special and superior
circumstances, they are entitled to special respect. The leading presentation of this vision of
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BEST, the opposition between such explanations on the one hand
and rational choice explanations on the other hand comprise but a
specific instance of a larger debate over how the political process
functions and, even more significantly, how it might function when it
is working well.  One view sees law as animated by public regarding
values, the other by self-interested ones.  One view sees law as the
result of deliberative processes in which political actors persuade
other actors of the correctness of certain policies, the other as the
result of exchanges that occur because actors perceive them as in
their own self-interest.
Standing as they do as one of the most noteworthy legislative
accomplishments of this century, working through the causes for the
BEST amounts to both a worthwhile undertaking in its own right,
and a potentially significant contribution to the larger debate.  This
essay will not be able to articulate a full causal explanation for the
BEST.  Its more modest ambition, instead, is to show that the easy
dismissal of rational choice explanations prevalent in the
environmental literature is unjustified.  Nothing in rational choice
theory debars groups of environmentally inclined individuals from
achieving their (self-interested) collective objectives.  After arguing
this point generally, the paper will identify several mechanisms—
each consistent with the basic  tenets of rational choice—that might
account for the political success of environmental interests during the
BEST time frame, and it will present some suggestive evidence that
the costs and benefits of collective action confronting such
individuals during this time frame were consistent with those
mechanisms operating effectively. All in all, as a first cut at the
problem, it is quite plausible to conclude that the rational choice
approach to collective action can provide a sound explanation for the
BEST, one in which these laws were driven primarily by citizen self-
interest.8
                                                                                                                                     
dualist democracy is BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
8. As indicated, however, this paper will not finally resolve whether the rational choice or
the republican moment explanation is superior.  For one thing, although it explains why the
environmental movement might be able to achieve legislative goals, it does not explain why the
industrial interests arrayed against costly environmental legislation lacked the ability to thwart
those efforts.  No equilibrium model is specified, in other words.  It is not my objective,
however, to claim that the rational choice approach is right and the republican moment
approach wrong.  To the contrary, I want precisely to question the sharp dichotomy that is
often drawn between the two.  The last section of the paper makes a few brief remarks about
the desirability of raising that question.
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II.  INTEREST GROUP THEORY AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A.  Interest Group Theory
Economics studies human exchanges and interactions with the
help of some simplifying assumptions about human behavior and the
concept of Pareto efficiency, defined as a state in which no individual
position can be improved upon without making someone else worse
off.  If all the items that individuals value were available for exchange
in perfectly functioning markets, these voluntary exchanges would
achieve Pareto efficiency on their own.  Few individual markets
function perfectly, however, let alone the entire system of markets,
and thus emerges a role for government and for public policy: to
improve on the workings of existing markets so that the combined
effects of markets and public policy more closely approximate a
Pareto outcome.
Welfare economists have for some time analyzed alternative
public policies with respect to their ability to produce more efficient
outcomes.  Only in the past thirty years, however, have economists
and political scientists analyzed the political arena in which those
policies are produced with the same tools employed to analyze other
interactions.  The key conceptual breakthrough enabling economic
theory to enter this arena was straightforward: simply apply the same
assumptions used to analyze marketplace behavior to the behavior of
political actors.  Regardless of their specific roles—consumers,
voters, legislators, presidents, bureaucrats—all individuals are treated
under a common set of assumptions.  They are goal-oriented (the
motivational assumption), they are able to rank different
combinations of those goals in a manner that satisfies the conditions
of transitivity and completeness (the rationality assumption), and
they make choices among alternative courses of action according to
which choice promises the more highly ranked bundle of preferences
(the behavioral assumption).
The Logic of Collective Action is one of the seminal
contributions to the economic approach to politics, or to the rational
choice approach, as it has come to be known.  Olson analyzed the
behavior of individuals in a sphere of activity essential to politics:
group activity striving to achieve benefits that would be shared by
non-contributors as well as contributors to the group effort.  Arguing
that most people would approach the decision to contribute or not by
weighing the costs and benefits, Olson predicted that groups would
be hard to organize when the group activity promised to produce
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benefits that were spread out among beneficiaries in amounts that
are small compared to the costs of securing them.  Each individual
would see that her contribution to the group effort was not going to
affect her own personal fortunes—either others would contribute
enough so that she could free-ride on their efforts or others would
not contribute and the minimal amount she was willing to contribute
would not put the effort over the top.  In either case, no benefits to
her would be produced by her contribution, and hence it would be
irrational to join in the group effort.
Groups whose benefits were diffuse in this sense were labeled
“latent” groups by Olson because the shared group benefit was likely
to remain  unrealized.  In contrast, groups that contain members with
more concentrated benefits would be more likely to organize, either
because a single member has enough at stake in the benefit to
underwrite individually the costs of securing the group benefit, or
because a subgroup of members within the larger group is small
enough so that they can effectively agree to pool sufficient resources
to produce the benefit.  Compared to latent groups, such groups as
these have a comparative advantage with respect to their ability to
organize to advance group interests.  Olson termed these groups
“privileged” and “intermediate,” respectively.
Within rational choice, a field of interest group theory has grown
up on these Olsonian foundations.  The interpretation of the theory
that supports Farber’s conclusions takes Olson’s analysis to imply
that groups such as environmental groups, whose benefits from
environmental protection legislation are unconcentrated or diffuse,
will not mobilize within the political arena to advance their group
interests.  It would be economically irrational, for example, “for
individual farmers to join a group seeking higher farm prices when
benefits from price increases would be enjoyed by all farmers, even
those who contribute nothing to the group.  Similarly, it would be
irrational for an individual consumer to become part of organized
attempts to lower consumer prices, when all consumers, members or
not, would reap the benefits.”9
The prediction that large, diffuse groups are at a disadvantage in
the political realm compared to smaller groups with more
concentrated interests suggests that the “general thrust” of politics
“is pretty grim.”  Policy debates quite often pit the interests of latent
9. Burdett A. Loomis & Allan J. Cigler, Introduction: The Changing Nature of Interest
Group Politics, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 1, 8 (Burdett A. Loomis & Allan J. Cigler, eds.,
4th ed. 1995).
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groups—broad, common interests—against those of more
concentrated groups.  In those situations, “the public goods that
government ought to be providing . . . are seldom passed by the
legislature, because the demand for them is usually not strong and
legislators gain too little from sponsoring them . . . .  Conversely,
rent-seeking statutes—primarily, concentrated benefit, distributed
[i.e., diffuse] cost measures—seem inevitable.”10
Interest group theory and its “pretty grim” thrust appear to have
direct relevance to environmental policy, where legislative policy
debates classically pit groups that stand to receive widely diffuse
benefits, such as clean air or clean water—all citizens who would
benefit from better environmental quality—against more
concentrated groups—the industries who will bear the costs of clean-
up.  The opposite of rent-seeking statutes, these are concentrated
cost, diffuse benefit measures.  It seems to follow that environmental
groups will remain latent.
So goes one standard account of Olson’s approach to interest
group theory. As stated so far, however, this account is far from a
complete retelling of Olson’s argument, or of interest group theory
generally.  A “ceteris paribus” clause is missing.  Olson only
concluded that  concentrated benefit groups will have an easier time
organizing to advance their interests than diffuse groups, other things
being equal.  Because things are seldom equal in the context-rich
world of politics, it is entirely possible that a presumptively latent
group can overcome its collective action problems to organize.  Thus,
an observation that some large, diffuse group has successfully
organized is not by itself inconsistent with the theory.
A little historical context can reinforce this point.  When The
Logic of Collective Action first appeared in 1965, the whole idea that
large group collective action was a problem requiring an explanation
amounted to a frontal assault on the then-prevalent pluralist
approach to the politics of groups.  The then-prevalent theory of
groups simply assumed, either tacitly or explicitly, that individuals
who shared a common interest in political outcomes would combine
10. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice
Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 294 (1988).  See also Einer R. Elhauge,
Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review? 101 YALE. L.J. 31, 39
(1991) (“Large diffusely interested groups will  tend to be underrepresented.”).
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forces to advocate and lobby for those outcomes.11  Olson’s logic
challenged this view, arguing that collective action becomes
problematic when viewed through the lens of rational choice’s basic
economic assumptions.  “The achievement of any common goal or
the satisfaction of any common interest means that . . . no one in the
group is excluded from the benefit or satisfaction brought about by
its achievement” whether or not the group member contributed to
that achievement.12  If an individual benefits whether or not she
contributes, why contribute?
Olson, however, certainly did not believe that large groups could
never organize, and his book is laced with examples of such large
group activity.13  He only believed that, in light of the incentives, how
such groups did successfully organize warranted further examination.
Confronted with the choice of enjoying the fruits of the collective
achievement without costly contributions from himself versus
enjoying those fruits minus the costs of his contributions, a self-
interested individual would choose to free ride on the efforts of
others—unless other incentives than the individual’s anticipated share
in the collective benefit were at play in the situation.  A good deal of
his book was devoted to explicating those other incentives, which he
termed “selective incentives.”14
Other scholars have produced an extensive and growing body of
literature exploring in detail how groups that might otherwise remain
latent manage to overcome the collective action problem.  The vast
majority of this literature stands firmly within the research tradition
that Olson’s approach established, elaborating especially on the
various kinds of selective incentives that groups provide their
membership in order to organize large groups effectively.
11. See OLSON, supra note 1, at 16-22.  See also Schuck, supra note 4, at 563. (“In [the
pluralist] view . . .  individuals who share common values and interests coalesce easily into
groups; such group formation reflects individuals’ natural social and political propensities.”).
12. OLSON, supra note 1, at 15. See also id. at 16 ([T]he “efforts [of the individual member
in the typical large organization] will not have a noticeable effect on the situation of his own
organization, and he can enjoy any improvements brought about by others whether or not he
has worked in support of his organization.”).
13. Olson in fact devoted an entire chapter of his book to explaining how collective goals
can be achieved as the by-product of organizations that provide selective incentives, and he
also salted his discussion of group dynamics with references to selective incentives that could
overcome the problem of latency.  See id. at 132-167.
14. Olson also offered coercion as a second means whereby groups could organize, id. at
48, but all the actions discussed in this essay are voluntary, so this explanation is not relevant to
the present discussion.
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At this point, a long string citation to the interest group
literature on selective benefits might be adequate to rebut the claim
that interest group theory implies environmental groups will not
organize.  Farber’s second prediction—if rational choice is correct,
environmental statutes will not exist—requires further attention.
While groups such as NRDC, EDF, NWF, Defenders of Wildlife,
LCV and others certainly are instrumental to environmental policy
successes as a matter of historical fact, explaining the organizational
success of those groups is at best one step removed from explaining
environmental policy success.15
It is commonly believed or assumed that interest groups
influence policy by virtue of their ability to raise financial resources.
Groups then invest those resources in campaign contributions,
political advertising, or in other expenditures designed to affect
elections.  On this account, environmental groups may be able to
organize, but they remain at a significant comparative disadvantage
in raising money to be used in this way, compared to their opponents.
If money explains policy results, environmental interests should still
lose.
Any such conclusion, however, rests on an additional fallacy.
The critical question with respect to political efficacy does not
concern fund raising ability alone.  The critical issue, rather, is
whether a group has access to effective tools to advance group
interests in the political arena.  The structure of political life is
fundamental here.  In a representative democracy, interest groups do
not make policy directly, legislatures do.  Consequently, groups must
provide incentives to legislators to act as their agents.  For
concentrated groups the main tools available are indeed financial.
Legislators, who are presumed by the economic approach to politics
to be motivated by re-election, are expected to be responsive to the
prospect of groups assisting them.
Large groups, however, have available to them something that
small groups lack: the ballot box power of the members of the group.
Their ability to marshal a significant number of votes can be a more
15. While the influence of environmental organizations in shaping federal statutory law is
manifest later in the Environmental Era, Elliott, Ackerman and Millian have argued that
environmental groups lacked significant influence in shaping the BEST.  Because these groups
were still nascent political actors in the 1969-73 time period, they lacked the stature that would
have permitted them to validate more moderate environmental laws.  Their absence from the
political bargaining table helps explain why the BEST contained such stringent regulatory
requirements.  See E. Donald Elliott et. al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The
Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 313 (1985).
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effective tool for advancing interests in the political arena than the
ability to marshal financial resources, which may or may not be
convertible into the appropriate currency.
A model developed by Arthur Denzau and Michael Munger
makes the point well.  Their model contains three actors—legislators
seeking to maximize votes and who can supply public policy,
organized interest groups who have no votes but can supply campaign
resources, and individuals who cannot supply campaign resources but
who do have votes.  They show in straightforward fashion that if
voters are informed (about their preferences and the relation of
policy proposals to those preferences), interest groups who have
campaign resources but no votes cannot influence policy.  “The
result, then, is that interest group policy manipulation is constrained
by the preferences of the geographic constituency.”16
Any complete statement of the interest group approach to
understanding the passage of environmental legislation must thus
recognize both (1) that even large, diffuse groups can enjoy some
organizational success, if the conditions are right and (2) that any
attempt to predict a group’s policy success must evaluate the ability
of the group to marshal votes at the ballot box.  When these
refinements are applied to the question of the BEST, it becomes
quite plausible to think that rational choice can provide an
explanation for their enactment.  Part II(C) sketches how that
explanation would go.
B.  Self-Interest
Before examining the rational choice approach to the BEST, I
need to clarify an apparent inconsistency.  I have claimed that the
economic, or rational choice, approach to politics and the republican
moment approach differ with respect to whether political actors were
motivated by self-interest or by regard for the public as a whole.17  I
have also claimed that  rational choice makes three core assumptions
about human action, but motivation based on self-interest was not
among them.18  This section amplifies on the role that self-interest
plays in the economic approach to politics and in the distinction
between that approach and its republican competitors.
16. Arthur Denzau & Michael Munger, Legislators and Interest Groups: How
Unorganized Interests Get Represented, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 89, 102 (1986).
17. See discussion supra pages 31-32.
18. See discussion supra page 33.
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The assumptions stated earlier can be summarized by saying
rational choice assumes that individuals pursue their preferences in a
rational manner.19  Insofar as rational choice theory in its general
form is concerned, no further assumptions are made about, and no
limitations are placed upon, the content of the preferences that
individuals are assumed to pursue.  Debra Satz and John Ferejohn
have employed the term “thin-rationality” to describe this
characteristic of general rational choice theory.20
Let me now define rational choice models as applications of the
core assumptions of rational choice to particular choice situations.
Such models typically do make further assumptions about the content
of those preferences beyond the core assumptions of rational choice
theory.  In the terminology of Satz and Ferejohn, they exhibit “thick-
rationality.”  Niskanen, for instance, hypothesizes that bureaucrats
seek to maximize budgets, because that maximizes their power,
influence and prospects for future income,21 and Mayhew postulates
that elected officials seek to maximize their chances of re-election.22
One of the most prevalent thick-rationality assumptions is that
individuals have preferences that are “selfish,” or that reflect their
“self-interest.”23  By itself, however, this statement remains
unsatisfactorily vague, because “self-interest” can have a number of
different meanings.  Here it is useful to identify three different ways
it which it is used.  The thinnest conception of self-interest assumes
19. Although I think there is broad consensus that the three assumptions identified earlier,
see discussion supra page 33, make up the core of rational choice, there are lively and on-going
debates within the field as to the necessity of elements of each of them.  Are models that drop
the maximizing feature of the behavioral assumption, for example, and replace it with Simon’s
concept of satisficing, entitled to be called “rational choice” models? Are models that drop the
assumption that individuals evaluate future prospects according to their expected utility, and
replace it with the heuristics of Kahneman and Tversky, or with the principle of minimax
regret, properly called “rational choice” models?  Are models that do not retain
methodological individualism, but rather acknowledge that certain higher-order social facts,
such as institutions, need not be explained by individual behavior alone, entitled to be called
“rational choice” models?  These debates are peripheral to the contest between public-
regarding deliberative accounts of legislation, on the one hand, and rational choice accounts on
the other.
20. Debra Satz & John Ferejohn, Rational Choice and Social Theory, 91 J. PHIL. 71, 84
(1994).
21. WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
(1971).
22. See generally DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974).
23. This assumption is so prevalent, in fact, that some synthesizers have concluded that it
belongs within the core of the rational choice approach.  See Kristen Renwick Monroe, The
Theory of Rational Action: Its Origins and Usefulness for Political Science, in THE ECONOMIC
APPROACH TO POLITICS 1, 4 ( Kristen Renwick Monroe ed., 1991).
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only that individuals act to maximize their own well-being, however
they experience it.  Altruism, concern for the state of society, and
additional other-regarding values can be a source of such individual
well-being, often called psychic well-being.  This conception rules out
very little as a potential source of preferences for individuals,
although the mechanism through which states of affairs generate
preferences is restricted to influencing the individual’s own well-
being.  This implies that people do not choose actions purely “for
their own sake,” or simply because that action expresses a value, or
because it complies with some social norm, or because of
considerations such as Sen’s idea of commitment.24  I will refer to this
conception as broad self-interest.
The next two conceptions of “self-interest” are thicker.  Both
might be considered species of egoism.  The thinner of the two
assumes that individuals choose actions on the basis of anticipated
effects on well-being that the individual experiences directly, not
indirectly.  Under this conception, which I will call broad egoism,
various kinds of psychic well-being are still permitted, such as the
feelings of rejuvenation produced by wilderness experiences, the
calm produced by a hour spent gazing at the breakers along a
shorefront, or the warm glow one may experience from participating
in a winning political campaign.  However, Sen’s sympathy25 and
other psychological states produced by knowing that someone else’s
welfare has been improved are not included in broad egoism.  Models
adopting the assumption of broad egoism assume that individuals do
not choose actions on the basis of such other-regarding effects.
A still thicker conception is material egoism.  Material egoism
limits the preferences assumed to form the basis of individual action
to those that contribute to material well-being, either directly
through income or wealth effects or indirectly by providing
something that can be readily converted to income or wealth or that
substitutes for something that would have to be purchased.  Warm
24. Sen defines commitment as “a person choosing an act that he believes will yield a
lower level of personal welfare to him than an alternative that is also available to him.”
Amartya Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Assumptions of Economic Theory,
in BEYOND SELF INTEREST 25, 32 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990).  Sen distinguishes this from
sympathy.  “When a person’s sense of well-being is psychologically dependent on someone
else’s welfare, it is a case of sympathy.” See id.  Similar distinctions would need to be drawn for
expressive values and social norms.  To the extent that expressing values or complying with
norms contributes to a person’s well-being, and the action is not being undertaken despite its
adverse effect on well-being, such choices are consistent with the broad self-interest.
25. See id.
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glows and psychic enjoyment of the environment do not affect
choices, nor do sympathies or the other-regarding values excluded by
broad self-interest.
As noted a moment ago, modelers of political activity generally
do not employ thin rationality in their models.  Instead they adopt
thick conceptions of self-interest to gain several possible advantages.
Wielding Occam’s Razor, they prefer the most parsimonious set of
assumptions that can adequately explain the phenomena, so the
fewer types of preferences the better.  Modelers also often make
thicker assumptions because they believe them to be true.  For
instance, they believe that, at least as a good, testable approximation,
legislators are motivated primarily by the desire to be re-elected, so
that a model employing that assumption will produce predictions that
approximate the real world. Finally, thicker assumptions produce
models that are more readily falsifiable than those based on thinner
assumptions because they often rely upon preferences that have more
easily observable indicators than those permitted by more thin-
rational accounts.26
Some rational choice modelers may value thickness to such an
extent that they eschew thinning out their accounts of rationality in
the face of apparent contradictions.  There is an obvious tension here
because descriptive accuracy is also a valuable asset in a theory of
political outcomes, especially when explanation of the underlying
causal mechanisms of those outcomes, rather than mere prediction of
them, counts as a goal.  “Sometimes the world is messy, and the most
parsimonious explanation is false.”27  For those who believe that
material egoist preferences are much too narrow to describe human
behavior, and that models based on them will produce false results,
the tension between generating testable hypotheses with thick
assumptions and employing more realistic assumptions can be
parodied.  For instance, Justice Breyer (then Professor Breyer) did so
when he observed that “insofar as interest group theory is interesting,
it may be false, and insofar as it’s true it doesn’t seem very
interesting.”28
26. For instance, Olson refused to incorporate moral incentives into his analysis because
he believed that “it is not possible to get empirical proof of the motivation behind any person’s
actions; it is not possible definitely to say whether a given individual acted for moral reasons or
for other reasons in some particular case.  A reliance on moral explanations could thus make
the theory untestable.”  See OLSON, supra note 1, at 61.
27. Jon Elster, Selfishness and Altruism, in BEYOND SELF INTEREST 44, 45 (Jane J.
Mansbridge ed., 1990).
28. Stephen Breyer, Roundtable Discussion, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
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The second half of Justice Breyer’s quip gestures toward the
manner in which the boundaries between rational choice accounts
and some of the alternatives tend to blur as the concept of self-
interest thins out.  If “having a taste” for altruism, or for doing one’s
duty counts as a self-interested preference, what is the point of
arguing whether people are motivated by self-interest or by altruism
or duty?29  In the present context, if we permit psychic satisfaction
that individuals may experience from struggling for moral or other-
regarding values to count as a component of an individual’s well-
being, it may well be impossible to distinguish people who are acting
on selfish interests (as just defined) from those acting because they
are persuaded by other-regarding reasons.
Of course, what is ultimately at stake here is more than a desire
to keep rational choice interesting.  At stake, rather, is our interest in
engaging the issues that actually separate people when they debate
the reasons why we have the environmental laws that we do, as well
as how politics in general functions.  At least as articulated by the
republican or deliberative democracy literature, the crucial boundary
line lies between egoism as the motivator of human decisions on the
one hand, and either thinner conceptions such as broad self-interest
or public-regarding motivations on the other.30  Are the BEST to be
explained as the product of individuals trying to satisfy pre-existing
egoistic preferences or are they to be explained as individuals first
suspending the pursuit of those preferences, subsequently reasoning
                                                                                                                                     
REGULATION: PRIVATE INTERESTS IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS 282 (Federal Trade
Commission 1984).
29. One study of the behavior of persons who harbored Jews at great personal risk during
the Second World War sought to examine whether they did so in spite of its impact on their
own well being—the altruistic explanation—or because of that impact—the rational choice
explanation.  “The argument that altruism is a ‘psychic good’ is . . . an often cited explanation
of altruism.  Do altruists simply have a taste for helping others, a taste which produces an
unusual utility function?  We found this explanation both the most powerful and the most
frustratingly tautological.  It is extremely difficult to operationalize in a way that allows one to
set a test by which it can be reliably accepted or rejected.”  Kristen Monroe et. al., Altruism and
the Theory of Rational Action: An Analysis of Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe, in THE
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO POLITICS 317, 326 (Kristen Renwick Monroe ed., 1991).
30. According to republican theory, a citizen exhibiting the necessary civic virtue will
possess a “willingness . . .  to subordinate their private interests to the general good.”  Frank I.
Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 18 (1986) (quoting G.
STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1986)). “Civic virtue can be understood as . . . the
motivation to deal with public questions by sincere engagement in deliberative colloquy aimed
at discernment of the general good . . . .”  Id. at 58.  “Political actors are not supposed to come
to the process with preselected interests . . . . The republican belief in deliberation counsels
political actors to achieve a measure of critical distance from prevailing desires and practices,
subjecting those desires and practices to scrutiny and review.” Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the
Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1548-49 (1988).
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together about what is best for the country as a whole, and finally
reaching a consensus?31
With this groundwork laid, the thesis of the next section of this
paper (and the main thesis of the paper as a whole) can be succinctly
stated: a plausible case can be made that the BEST are the product of
individuals rationally pursuing egoistic preferences.32  Such an
explanation can certainly not be dismissed on the kind of logical or
deductive grounds suggested by Farber and others, and it is
consistent with a good deal of what we know about people’s
preferences during the BEST enacting period.  In order to test
republican moment theories against rational choice theories,
however, we will need a much deeper inquiry into actual historical,
social and cultural circumstances of the BEST period than this brief
essay can supply.
C.  A Rational Choice Account of the BEST
According to rational choice, whether individuals contribute to
collective activities that promote environmental quality turns on the
costs and benefits involved, and these depend upon the precise
“contribution” being considered.
One such contributing action might be joining an environmental
organization, as many individuals joined environmental organizations
toward the end of the 1960s and early 1970s.33  Rational choice
31. In the best accounts of deliberative democracy, reaching consensus is neither assumed
nor required to occur every time a public issue becomes subject to deliberative debate.  See,
e.g., John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 93, 115 (James
Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997) (“Close agreement is rarely achieved, and abandoning
public reason [i.e., deliberation] whenever disagreement occurs in balancing values is in effect
to abandon it altogether . . . .  A vote can be held on a fundamental question as on any other;
and if the question is debated by appeal to political values and citizens vote their sincere
opinion, the ideal is sustained.”).  As the product of a republican moment, however, the BEST
would seem to be one of those occasions for which republican environmental theorists would
wish to claim consensus had been achieved.
32. The next section begins, in fact, by restricting preferences to those subsumed under
material egoism only.  It then expands the permissible preference set to egoist preferences
generally.  Among other things, this expansion provides room for Carole Jean Uhlaner’s
“relational goods.”  “Relational goods are goods that can only be ‘possessed’ by mutual
agreement and after appropriate joint actions by a person and specific other people (or people
from a specific set.)  For example, friendship is a relational good; one (nondelusional) person
cannot decide unilaterally to be a friend.  Sociability, solidarity, and many instances of norm
fulfillment also involve relational goods.”  Carole Jean Uhlaner, What the Downsian Voter
Weighs: A Reassessment of the Costs and Benefits of Action, in INFORMATION, PARTICIPATION
AND CHOICE 67, 75 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1993).
33. See text infra at note 54.
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explanations have been offered for the considerable membership
spurt during this period, but these are not our main focus here.34  As
stated earlier, the critical contribution that environmentally inclined
individuals made during this period was “voting environmental,” not
sending a check to the NWF in response to a membership drive, so it
is the rational choice account of this action that will constitute our
focus.35
The decision to vote is one of the most studied issues in rational
choice, and to this day there is no unanimity on the correct way to
understand it.  There is, however, a fairly broad consensus on how to
analyze it or how to break the decision into its components.36  An
important article by Riker and Ordeshook37 identified those
components as:  R = pb  - c + d, where R equals the reward from
voting;  b equals the individual benefits should her candidate prevail;
p equals the probability that the individual’s vote will be decisive; c
equals the costs of voting; and d equals the benefits that accrue as a
result of voting per se.38
Including the d term in the Riker and Ordeshook equation
permits including non-material egoistic preferences in the rewards
from voting.  The most compelling rational choice accounts of the
BEST include such preferences.  It is useful to develop the case for
34. For a summary of the explanations that have been offered for the rise of
environmental interest groups, rational choice and otherwise, see Helen M. Ingram et. al,
Interest Groups and Environmental Policy in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY 115,
117-25 (James P. Lester ed., 2d ed., 1995).
35. Claiming that willingness to vote was the crucial action is not meant to belittle other
aspects of the environmental movement’s efforts to influence public policy, which included
increasingly sophisticated lobbying operations in Washington.  See, e.g., Robert Cameron
Mitchell, From Conservation To Environmental Movement: The Development of the Modern
Environmental Lobbies, in GOVERNMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 104-06 (Michael J.
Lacey ed., 1989).  These other efforts would not themselves have been sufficient, however,
without the ballot power of environmentalists behind them.  On the rational choice hypothesis,
such efforts were additional components of political entrepreneurship, as the leaders of the
national organizations attempted to cash in on the resource potential available in
environmentalism.
36. Once again, the unsettled waters of rational choice prevent any claim of complete
unanimity.  For a review of the various treatments of the voting decisions, see Uhlaner, supra
note 32, and John Aldrich, Rational Choice and Turnout, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 246 (1993).
Aldrich, a distinguished student of elections, doubts that the voting decision is a very good
instance of rational choice at all because it is a low-cost, low-benefit decision to which the
rational choice calculus of costs and benefits may not be well suited.
37. William H. Riker & Peter C. Ordeshook, A Theory of the Calculus of Voting, 62 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 25, 28 (1968).
38. See Aldrich, supra note 36 at 252; MELVIN J. HINICH & MICHAEL C. MUNGER,
ANALYTICAL POLITICS 144-52 (1997).
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the BEST, however, by first examining the nature of the purely
material egoistic account.  Therefore, this section proceeds by
examining the nature of the p, b, and c terms first.  Although
ultimately less plausible than accounts that include d, scenarios under
which material egoism alone accounted for the BEST are not
impossible.
Without d, the decision to vote environmental reduces to a
question of whether or not pb changed in the crucial enacting period
such that it became greater than c.  Such a change might occur
through an increase in b, an increase in p, or both.
For many Americans, the value of b was increasing, perhaps
substantially, during the 1960s.  During that decade, the
environmental movement broadened its organizational and
conceptual foundations, adding to its traditional emphasis on
conservation and natural resources a new and vital attention to the
relationship between the environment and human well-being.  People
began paying especially close attention to adverse environmental
impacts on human health.  “While the public interest in natural
environments rested on aesthetic objectives, the concern for
pollution had its roots in new attitudes toward the biological
environment and human health.”39  By the 1970s, these effects on
human health of environmental pollution had come to dominate the
policy debates over environmental policy, but the foundations for this
emphasis were being laid in the 1960s.
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, published in 1962, signaled this
emphasis perhaps more clearly than any other single event.  Carson
“endeavored to make the problem of pesticide use as meaningful as
possible to the ordinary person; hence her use of the silent spring
metaphor and her emphasis on DDT’s potential effects on human
health.”40  Additional noteworthy developments in the 1960s included
mounting evidence out of California associating automobile
emissions with smog, and smog with adverse health effects. Also,
water pollution effects were widely publicized including (1) large fish
kills in the Passaic River in New Jersey from pollution that also
threatened drinking water and (2) high levels of radioactive
contamination in rivers in southwestern Colorado and northwestern
New Mexico.41  In short, “the potential threat to health and life posed
39. Samuel P. Hays, Three Decades of Environmental Politics: The Historical Context, in
GOVERNMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 19, 24-25 (Michael J. Lacey ed. 1989).
40. Mitchell, supra note 35, at 86.
41. See JOSEPH M. PETULLA, AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY 411-12 (2d ed.
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by many of the pollution issues allow[ed] the [environmental] groups
to motivate contributors by portraying the potential losses if these
conditions are allowed to continue.”42
These health interests were complemented by rising interest in
the movement’s more traditional aesthetic values of wilderness and
recreational areas, which were perceived as coming under increasing
threat during this period as well.  The Sierra Club had “gone
national” in the 50s and early 60s on the basis of fights against Echo
Park Dam which threatened Dinosaur National Monument in
Colorado, and then against the damming of the Grand Canyon.43  As
individuals came to see their health, aesthetic and recreational values
increasingly under attack from activities that polluted the
environment or altered natural landscapes, the benefit they
associated with actions to protect the environment also increased.
The growing benefits associated with improvements in
environmental quality contributed to a growing demand for
environmentally protective measures that was further assisted by the
effects of rising incomes.  Research indicates that environmental
quality behaves like a normal good, so that demand for it increases as
incomes increase.44  The demand for environmental quality went up
in the 1960s due to this income effect because the decade of 1960-
                                                                                                                                     
1988).  A year before publishing Silent Spring, Carson had authored an article entitled, “How
Safe Is Your Drinking Water?” in Redbook  (Aug. 1961).
42. Mitchell, supra note 35, at 95.  The motivational force of anticipated losses in health
may be an even stronger than that of gains.  See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Rational
Choice and the Framing of Decisions, in  THE LIMITS OF RATIONALITY 67-70 (Karen Schweers
Cook & Margaret Levy eds., 1990).  See also John Hansen, The Political Economy of Group
Membership, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 79, 81 (1985) (“In sum, people are more easily mobilized
in response to threats than in response to prospects.”) Some would argue that incorporating
such arguments as this into the analysis violates the expected utility condition that is part of
rational choice, but the effect has considerable experimental verification.  The role of such
arguments in rational choice’s “core” is contested territory.  See supra note 19.
43. Hays argues that the first element of modern environmentalism to appear,
“dominating the years from 1958 to 1965, was the drive to manage resources as natural
environments for human enjoyment.” Hays, supra note 39, at 28. Although it was the “new
concerns for public health” that soon came to drive policy debate and calls for action.  Id. at 34.
44. See, e.g., Matthew E. Kahn & John G. Matsusaka, Demand for Environmental Goods:
Evidence from Voting Patterns on California Initiatives, 40 L. & ECON. 137 (1997).  Mitchell
notes that, with the exception of the National Wildlife Federation, “environmental contributors
are disproportionately well educated and economically well off.”  He reports that in 1978, only
22 percent of the membership  of national environmental organizations had household incomes
below that national mean.  Mitchell, supra note 35, at 98.  Hays notes that rising incomes meant
that “consumers had considerable discretionary income, which could be spent in many ways to
make life more enjoyable.  Environmental consumption was an integral part of this new
direction of the economy.”  The public goods features of many environmental amenities meant,
however, that collective action was necessary to provide them.  Hays, supra note 39, at 26.
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1970 saw the largest increase in per capita income the country has
ever seen.  During this period, median family income rose from
$27,384 to $37,485 in constant dollars.45
All of this suggests that by the time of the critical BEST enacting
period of 1969-73, the value of the benefits, especially but not
exclusively health benefits, that individuals stood to gain from
legislative action that reduced environmental deterioration had
increased substantially from previous levels, undoubtedly standing at
an all-time historical high.
In terms of the logic of collective action, rising individual
benefits from collective action may or may not produce collective
action. Overcoming the collective action problem depends on the
interaction of p, b and c.  Olson’s central point—that individual
members of large diffuse groups would conclude that his or her
individual contribution in fact could not make a difference–-is
equivalent to reasoning that p is very small, in which case pb < c,
even for large values of b.  So long as the individual believes her
contribution is insignificant, even large values for b will not produce
individual action to advance collective interests.
It is not a logical consequence of Olson’s theory that an
individual member of a large group must in fact conclude her effort is
insignificant, however.  Olson simply reasoned that this conclusion
was likely, most of the time, in the case of large groups.46  Even
members of large groups can experience situations in which they
believe that their contribution might be crucial, if enough other
45. See United States Census Bureau, Historical Income Tables – Families,  Table F-7,
(visited July 1, 1998) http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/f07.html.  Figures are in 1996
dollars. This is by far the largest increase, in both absolute and percentage terms, during the
postwar period.  In 1950, median family income stood at $23,365, and it was almost stagnant in
the 70s and 80s, standing at $40,079 in 1980 and $42,400 in 1990.  Id.
46. Olson does define latent groups to be those in which an individual’s contribution to the
collective effort is insignificant.  In his words:
[A latent group] is distinguished by the fact that, if one member does or does not help
provide the collective good, no other one member will be significantly affected and
therefore none has any reason to react.  Thus an individual in a “latent” group, by
definition, cannot make a noticeable contribution to any group effort, and since no
one in the group will react if he makes no contribution, he has no incentive to
contribute.
OLSON, supra note 1, at 50.  Had Olson equated latent groups and large groups, then the
argument that some large groups can surmount the collective action problem without the aid of
selective incentives would be contrary to Olson’s reasoning.  However, the best reading of
Olson is that he did not view latent groups and large groups as synonymous, so that in fact both
small latent groups and large non-latent groups are possible.  For an excellent textual exegesis
interpreting Olson’s reasoning along these lines, see RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION
38-49 (1982).
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members of the group also contributed. To help identify situations in
which individuals might well hold this belief, we can follow Russell
Hardin in defining k for any group of size n, k  n, as the “minimum
efficacious group,” or the smallest number of individuals who must
contribute to the group effort in order for it to succeed.47  Suppose
that an individual believes that she and k-1 others are considering
contributions to the group venture.  In that circumstance, her
contribution will make the difference between success and failure in
the venture.  If she contributes, and the others do, too, she receives b-
c from the group activity.  If, on the other hand, she doesn’t
contribute, she will receive 0.  If she is sufficiently confident that the
others will contribute, she gains more than she loses from
contributing herself and therefore has an incentive to do so.
One situation in which an individual might have reason to
believe that her contribution was crucial in this way occurs when k =
n.  In other words, the minimum efficacious group equals the size of
the group as a whole.  Each individual’s contribution is now crucial.
In such a situation, each person knows that in order to achieve the
group goal, she (and everyone else) will have to contribute.  Free
riding has been replaced by Ben Franklin’s advice to his fellow
signers of the Declaration of Independence that “we must all hang
together or we will assuredly all hang separately.”48  Everyone,
furthermore, is similarly situated, so everyone knows this.  In such a
situation, Shepsle and Bonchek argue that each person will make the
following calculation:
If I don’t contribute, then I get a payoff of 0.  If I contribute, and so
does everyone else, then I get a payoff of b - c > 0.  If I contribute,
but someone else does not, then I get -c.  Everyone else makes the
same calculation.  Everyone will realize that everyone in the group
appreciates his or her own essential status, on the one hand, and
that there is nothing to be gained by not contributing (aside from
avoiding putting oneself at risk) on the other hand.49
As k becomes less than n, it becomes less and less likely that any
member will think her contribution to be essential, and less and less
likely that any member will impute failure to achieve the group goal
to any other specific person in the group.  Shepsle and Bonchek
47. In that case, k satisfies the condition that  c(k-1) < C, ck ≥ C, where C = the cost of
obtaining the group benefit.
       48. Benjamin Franklin, Remarks at the Signing of the Declaration of Independence (July 4,
1776), in JOHN BARTLETT, FRANKLIN QUOTATIONS 384 (Emily Morrison Beck ed., 1968).
49. KENNETH SHEPSLE & MARK BONCHEK, ANALYZING POLITICS 228-29 (1997).
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reason, however, that the “Ben Franklin” effect can remain in play
for at least some k’s less than n: “The general conclusion of this
analysis is that the combination of strategic and psychological
pressures that encourage contribution rise as k gets large relative to
n.”50  Expressed in terms of the Riker and Ordeshook equation, p can
be greater than zero even for large groups, if the conditions are right.
In order for conditions in large groups to generate the Ben
Franklin effect, an individual must believe both that her individual
effort will succeed only if combined with a substantial majority of the
other group members and that those other individuals also believe
this.  Without the second belief, she will have no reason to suppose
that other members are aware of the possibility of large joint benefits
if only they all pitch in.  Large groups, however, frequently suffer
from a low level of shared knowledge.  Members of large groups can
be unaware of who other group members are, they may be unable to
gauge their combined strength, or they can be divided or ambivalent
about the course of action that would best achieve their objectives.
Any of these deficiencies can perpetuate group latency.
On the other hand, under conditions of increasing values of b, as
existed during the 1960s for those who valued the health benefits and
the aesthetic and recreational values associated with environmental
amenities, a dynamic comes into play that improves the possibilities
that latency can be overcome.  As b is increasing for each such
individual, so is the sum of these benefits, B, to all the individuals in
the group.  At some point, B becomes substantially larger than the
total costs, C, of obtaining the collective benefit, even if b remains
small in comparison to C.  There is thus an opportunity for some
individual to invest resources in solving the group’s collective action
problem.  If a solution can be found for some amount, O, such that
C+O is still less than B, then it is possible that this problem solver
and the group can arrange a mutually beneficial exchange, in which
the problem solver expends O in order to overcome the collective
action problem.  Individuals in the group ought to be willing to pay,
and the problem solver ought to be willing to accept, any amount
between B-C and O as payment for providing these services.
In one of the first reviews of The Logic of Collective Action,
Richard Wagner suggested that political interest groups were often
organized and maintained through the efforts of just such problem
50. Id. at 232.
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solvers, whom Wagner called political entrepreneurs.51  In the
appendix to the 1971 edition of his book, Olson gratefully
acknowledged the contribution that the notion of political
entrepreneurship made to the theory of collective action, seeing that
the idea of an entrepreneur who would work to solve the collective
action problem “does not contradict [the] logic [of the argument
made in The Logic of Collective Action] or invalidate its conclusions,
but rather enriches the argument, and makes it a better tool for the
study of organization leadership and change.”52
One special category of such political entrepreneurs are those
who run for elected office.  Under the conditions that existed in the
1960s, the potential electoral consequences were enormous for the
entrepreneur who could convince members of a large group that
electing him will promote the group’s environmental interests
because the magnitude of the b term may then swamp whatever
offsetting benefits individuals associate with the entrepreneur’s
opponent.  The group issue becomes politically salient.
In order to cash in on these potential electoral benefits,
environmental group entrepreneurs needed to create a base of shared
knowledge for members of the group, make believable projections of
group success only if substantial numbers of group members acted
together, and propose specific legislative actions to achieve that
success.  Under those conditions, an environmentally inclined
individual could conclude that pb > c, both with respect to the
decision to vote environmental and with respect to other possible
contributions to the group cause.53
51. Richard Wagner, “Pressure Groups and Political Entrepreneurs,” Papers in Non-
Market Decision Making I 161 (1966).
52. OLSON, supra note 1, at 178.  Thus, any implication in Farber, supra note 2, that
political entrepreneurship is an addition to interest group theory that was either unaccounted
for by Olson’s own analysis or somehow an alteration of the basic logic of collective action that
underlies interest group theory is mistaken.
53. Professor Farber’s republican moment account of the BEST also relies heavily on
political entrepreneurs but with the implication that they were tapping into republican
motivations, not self-interested ones.  Farber, supra note 2, at 65-67.  Without empirical
investigation, however, it is impossible to tell which motivations they were tapping.  Jerry
Mashaw states the relationship between political entrepreneurs and voters with more
appropriate neutrality: “Rather than waiting for some demand to emerge from organized
interests, entrepreneurial politicians pursued issues of interest to a broader electorate and used
the voters’ positive responses to political advantage in seeking national office.”  MASHAW,
supra note 4, at 33.  By referring to the electorate, Mashaw may be assuming that
entrepreneurs typically tap interests of people who are already planning to vote, rather than
organizing and getting to the polls groups of individuals not otherwise inclined to vote. The
analysis in the text has not made that assumption.  The Riker and Ordeshook equation seeks to
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Evidence from the 60s and early 70s is highly compatible with
the possibility that political entrepreneurs were recognizing the great
electoral potential of the environmental movement.  President Nixon
and Senator Muskie, who in the BEST time frame was aspiring to be
the Democratic nominee for president, repeatedly challenged each
other for the mantle of chief environmental legislative advocate, and
for good reason.  In 1960, the then-existing seven national
conservation groups had total membership of 124,000 (membership
defined as dues paying).  By 1969, total membership of these seven
groups had grown to 819,000.  By 1972, membership in eleven groups
(adding EDF, NRDC, FOE and EA to the list, but with these
contributing insignificantly to the total) equaled 1,127,000.54  If we
follow John Aldrich's reasoning that the act of voting is a low-cost
activity,55 we might well conclude that the number of individuals
willing to join environmental organizations significantly understates
the number willing to vote environmental.  Were that number to be
four times larger than the membership figures, for example, this
suggests a potential voting bloc in the neighborhood of 4 to 5 million
individuals.  A little more than 73 million people cast votes for
president in 1968.56  The opportunity to grab the major chunk of a 5 -
7 % voting bloc would attract any elected official’s interest.  If the
number of people willing to vote environmental more closely
approximated the estimated 20 million individuals who participated
in Earth Day on April 25, 1970, candidates would most definitely
grasp the significance of the environmental issue in electoral terms.
Direct evidence as to how much priority voters gave to
environmental benefits is scanty, but what information exists suggests
a level of political saliency sufficient to make environmental issues a
significant electoral force.  One study reported by Dunlap, for
example, shows 15% of the public indicated that they would probably
not vote for a candidate if they disagreed with his or her
environmental views.57
Up to this point, the analysis has been examining why
environmentally inclined individuals might find the estimated
benefits of going to the polls to vote for environmentally preferable
                                                                                                                                     
analyze the choice between voting and not voting.  If we instead assume that environmentally
inclined individuals are already planning to vote, then the argument that environmental
interests can explain the BEST becomes even more powerful.  See text infra notes 58-60.
54. Mitchell, supra note 35, at 96 Table 2.2.
55. Aldrich, supra note 36.
56. LYN RAGSDALE, VITAL STATISTICS ON THE PRESIDENCY 100 Table 3.1 (1996).
57. Farber, supra note 2, at 67 n.12.
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candidates sufficient to outweigh the costs of voting, as well as why
candidates would attempt to create the necessary conditions so that
such individuals would realize that voting was worth the effort.  One
might think that this is more than a theory seeking to explain the
BEST needs to accomplish.  If we instead took it as given that
roughly 70 million individuals already intended to vote in 1968 and
1972, and that environmentally inclined individuals were sufficiently
represented in those numbers, then an analysis of the hefty influence
that environmental issues had in the Congress during this period does
not have to explain why individuals came to believe that the benefits
of voting outweighed the costs.  It simply needs to explain why
environmentally inclined individals would choose the
environmentally superior candidate once at the polls.  For that job, it
is not necessary to show how environmental interests were organized,
but only to show why a voter would prefer an environmental
candidate to her opponent.58
A political entrepreneur who figures out that environmental
issues are salient to enough voters can take advantage of citizen
preferences for environmental quality even if environmental interests
remain unorganized.59  She does this by proposing a program that
advances those interests, and bundles this program with positions on
other politically relevant issues so as to swing environmental votes
her way. So long as individuals who have already decided to vote
desire environmental goods strongly enough, a political entrepreneur
can swing votes her way without relying on the Ben Franklin effect at
all, because the choice one faces at the polls—which candidate to
vote for—depends upon the comparative attractions of the opposing
candidate’s platforms and policy positions, not upon some assessment
58. Denzau and Munger’s model of voters, interest groups and representatives takes this
approach.  Under their model, voters remain unorganized.  Whether representatives satisfy
special interest group demands or the demands of their unorganized constituents depends upon
whether the constituents are adequately informed about the consequences of legislative action
for their own preferences.  If they are, constituent preferences prevail over special interests.
Denzau & Munger, supra note 16, at 102.
59. Trubeck and Gillen’s analysis of the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act
concludes that environmental interests prevailed despite being relatively unorganized at the
time.  “NEPA [and other BEST successes] were not the result of normal group politics.
Rather, these laws emerged from a period in which mass attention had been drawn to
environmental concerns through the media and the activity of politicians and policy
entrepreneurs who worked from relatively narrow organizational bases.” David M. Trubeck &
William J. Gillen, Environmental Defense II: Examining the Limits of Interest Group Advocacy,
in PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 195, 216 (B.
Weisbrod et al., eds., 1978).
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of p.  Indeed, if the environmental interests are sufficiently strong,
both candidates in a race may seek to appeal to these interests.  Don
Elliott, Bruce Ackerman and John Millian have suggested that these
entrepreneurial dynamics were at play when Senator Edmund
Muskie and President Richard Nixon each sought to gain the
environmental high ground in 1969-71, even though environmental
organizations were still relatively unorganized.60
Finally, an even stronger rational choice case for the BEST can
be made by expanding the permissible range of egoistic preferences
beyond material ones alone, to include certain kinds of non-material
egoistic returns to individual well being.  In the Riker and Ordeshook
equation, these are captured by the d term; in Olson’s terminology,
these are a subset of selective incentives or benefits that accrue only
to participants in the collective activity.61 Selective benefits accrue to
individuals by virtue of their participation in some group activity.  It
seems quite likely that they played a considerable role in the political
potency of environmental interests being able to enact the BEST.
Individuals quite regularly experience positive feelings when
acting in concert with others whose values they respect and share and
whose opinions they value.62  Sharing bonds of friendship or solidarity
with others creates incentives to respond to calls for support or
assistance when others in the group ask for it.63  These incentives can
60. Elliott et al., supra note 15, at 324-29.
61. OLSON, supra note 1, at 51 (“[O]nly a separate and ‘selective’ incentive will stimulate a
rational individual in a latent group to act in a group-oriented way.”). Olson conceived of
political entrepreneurs for large groups as engaged entirely  in the enterprise of producing
selective incentives.  Id. at 177.  Different interpretations can be given to the content of the d
term.  In my opinion, accounts of the d term that incorporate a role for groups and entrepren-
eurs are superior to the more standard interpretation of d as simply “citizen duty.” See, e.g,
Riker and Ordeshook, supra note 37.  When d is interpreted as citizen duty, the result is to
explain voting behavior without any reference to candidate-specific information, such as the
candidate’s policy positions and the efforts of a campaign to mobilize voters, thus removing the
politics from analysis of the most fundamental political action a citizen takes.  Interpreting d in
terms of allegiance to groups and the efforts of leaders to advance group interests by increasing
support for candidates who take preferred policy positions puts political activity back into the
equation.  See, e.g., Aldrich, supra note 36; Ulhaner, supra note 32.
62. Olson recognized the possibility that group allegiance could supply selective
incentives.  Id. at 60-61.  They are fully consistent with his  overall analysis.  As he put it, “[t]he
existence of these social incentives to group-oriented action does not, however, contradict or
weaken the analysis of this study.  If anything, it strengthens it,  for social status and social
acceptance are individual, noncollective goods.  Social sanctions and social rewards are
‘selective incentives’ . . . .” Id. at 60-61.
63. See, e.g., Carole J. Uhlaner, Rational Turnout: The Neglected Role of Groups, 33 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 390, 396-97 (1989) (noting studies using altruism toward group members as one
measure of social groups employed in the “social identification model” employed by
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be increased by such contextual factors as whether the group is
perceiving a threat as opposed to anticipating a benefit, whether
there is a sense of urgency about the threat, and whether the
individual has adequate knowledge about the threat.64  Willingness to
act can also be affected by whether or not the proper course of action
seems well-defined or ambiguous.
The incorporation of these benefits from participation adds
significantly to the earlier analysis because it now becomes plausible
to believe that collective action need not depend so heavily on the
rather razor-edge belief that the minimum size of an efficacious
group is close to the full group size.65  To the contrary, group
participatory benefits would now depend more upon a “tipping
point” phenomenon, as suggested by Thomas Shelling:66 in order for
individuals to have adequate incentives to participate, the number of
others participating only needs to achieve a certain critical size, such
that each individual has real assurance that what he or she is doing
will be positively valued by herself and by others.67  For political
action, this critical size may be as large as k because groups that
attempt to influence policy and succeed seem likely to generate more
participating benefits than those that fail.  Once that size had been
achieved, however, the presence of these participatory benefits might
well mean that participation is an equilibrium, even in situations
where k is significantly less than n.  The gains from participating
would now equal b + d - c, whereas the gains from not participating
equal  b.  So long as d > c, environmentally inclined individuals have
more to gain from participating than from abstaining.  Because
voting seems to be a low cost activity,68 it seems quite plausible that
the participatory benefits, d, could exceed the voting costs, c, for
many such individuals.
Political entrepreneurs help create the conditions for
participation to seem superior to non-participation (1) by defining
the proper course of action and then communicating that widely, (2)
                                                                                                                                     
sociologists).
64. See Ingram et. al., supra note 34, at 121 (noting threats to “one’s environment or the
general environment” as a major reason why individuals joint environmental groups).
65. See text supra notes 47-50.
66. THOMAS SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 102-10 (1978).  See also
the elaboration of this idea in the specific context of political action in DENNIS CHONG,
COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 112-40 (1991).  I am grateful to Don
Hornstein for this reference.
67. “[P]articipation will go up to the extent [leaders] can foster the desire of citizens to be
like others and citizen beliefs that others will act.” Uhlaner, supra note 32, at 76.
68. See Aldrich, supra note 36.
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by stressing the significance of the threat at hand, and (3) by
regularly proclaiming the need for immediate action.69  The tasks
such entrepreneurs must undertake in order to stimulate such group
or social incentives are to a large degree just those noted in the
earlier discussion of entrepreneurial activity.70  The environmental
movement developed a tremendously positive image in the 1960s.
This made it highly attractive to many members of society and hence
facilitated individual identification with group objectives.  Contrary
to popular perception, the movement was not primarily nostalgic for
simpler days, but progressive and forward looking.  Samuel Hays
explores at length the various strands of progressivism and optimism
that were interwoven in the environmental movement during this
period (and which continue to be part of it).71  Especially when it was
first breaking onto the national scene in the late 1950s and 1960s,
environmentalism presented its core ideas of ecological
interdependence as providing a breakthrough paradigm for properly
understanding the human-environment relationship.72
The environmental movement of the 1960s and 70s may also
have benefited in comparison with other national issues and themes.
America was displaying a significant dark side on other fronts,
including a divisive war, urban unrest, campus violence, riots and
strife over civil rights.  Environmentalism’s ability to attract
allegiance may have been enhanced by the favorable contrast of its
positive image to these darker places in American society.73  In sum,
69. See generally N. Schofield, Anarchy, Altruism and Cooperation, A Review, 2 SOC.
CHOICE & WELFARE 207 (1985), pointing out that:
[T]he fundamental theoretical problem underlying the question of cooperation is the
manner by which individuals attain knowledge of each others preferences and likely
behavior.  Moreover, the problem is one of common knowledge, since each individual,
i,  is required not only to have information about others preferences, but also to know
that the others have knowledge about i’s own preferences and strategies.
Id. at 218.  Entrepreneurs help like minded individuals to overcome this common knowledge
problem.
70. See text supra notes 51-53, 59-60.  Carole Uhlaner’s incorporation of groups into voter
turnout analysis emphasizes the intermediary role of group leaders.  She argues that those
leaders can negotiate a shift in a candidate’s policy position “as part of a trade with leaders for
turnout.”  Then, “[t]he leaders function as entrepreneurs who provide the structure—and
selective incentives—for organizations in exchange for capturing a portion of the surplus. . . .”
Uhlaner, supra note 32, at 74.
71. See Hays, supra note 39, at 19-81.
72. See id. at 23.
73. Environmentalism resonated with so many people that Riley Dunlap concludes that it
had become a consensual public policy issue by the early 70s.  Riley E. Dunlap & Angela G.
Mertig, The Evolution of The U.S. Environmental Movement from 1970 to 1990: An Overview,
in AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM: THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT, 1970-1990 1
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leading up to the BEST period, environmentalism seems to have
possessed great ability to produce good feelings that could be
actuated in individuals when they took concrete steps to put their
new, positive understandings into action through voting, through
contributions to environmental organizations, and in other ways.
Invoking the participatory benefits that individuals receive from
acting along with others to achieve group objectives employs a
thinner conception of self-interest than material egoism, but one that
can still be egoistic.  The operating hypothesis is that individuals
identify with environmentalism because it provides them an
intellectual framework  as well as a social framework enabling them
to understand the interaction between human action, nature and
their own material welfare—safe drinking water, clean air, a world
uncontaminated by toxic chemicals or man-made radiation, and so
on.  Hence extending the conception of self-interest to include
participatory benefits does not collapse the rational choice scenario
for the BEST into the republican moment account.  It does not
commit us to the idea that individuals put self-interest aside to
advance a program based on moral principles or on a conception of
what was best for the country as a whole, regardless of the effects of
that program on their own well-being.  Identification with environ-
mental group values can itself be rooted in material preferences
because environmentalism offers a way to understand threats to
environmental quality that individuals were concerned about  for
material self-interested reasons.  The ability of the movement to sell
its ideas may well have been predicated on the consistency of those
ideas with the material interests of its adherents.
II.  WHAT’S WRONG WITH SELF-INTERESTED ENVIRONMENTALISM
ANYWAY?
The economic approach to politics and the approach of
deliberative democrats and republicans diverge in important respects.
Of central relevance to this essay, they have different approaches to
the role of self-interest in political life.  Economic, or rational choice,
theories of politics hypothesize that many political outcomes are
explicable by assuming that political actors seek to advance their self-
interest.  Deliberative democrats argue that self-interest should not
motivate political behavior and should not constitute a reason for
political action.  In their view,  we should aspire in our public lives to
                                                                                                                                     
(1992).
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decision making via procedures of fair and rational deliberation
among equals in which selfish preferences play no role.
These approaches do not necessarily contradict one another,
because one is positive, modeling political decisions as they are, while
the other is normative, describing political decisions as they ought to
be.  Still, the strictures that deliberative democrats would place on
the political process are sufficiently heroic that arguments for their
feasibility are greatly assisted by historical examples.  Such examples
can be pointed to as proof of the realistic possibility of the theory,
and hence can buttress a conviction that striving to achieve the
conditions of deliberative democracy would not be fruitless.  The
Constitution itself is perhaps most frequently invoked as the product
of a republican moment.74  According to accounts such as Farber’s,
which reflects opinions that are widely shared by many defenders of
federal environmental regulation, the BEST constitute the product of
a similar period.
The republican moment explanation for the BEST, however,
rests on an attempted proof by elimination.  By claiming that the
economic approach to politics fails even to be logically capable of
explaining the BEST, the republican moment approach eliminates a
formidable competing theory, without any inquiry into the particulars
and circumstances ordinarily required in an exercise of historical
causal explanation.  This essay has argued that the charge of logical
incompatibility is mistaken.  The rational choice approach to interest
groups does in fact have the resources to offer plausible scenarios
based on self-interested mechanisms that might well explain the wave
of environmental legislation passed between 1969-73.  In addition,
the essay has presented suggestive, but admittedly incomplete,
empirical evidence that a rational choice explanation is plausible in
the particular circumstances existing during this period.
This essay, however, need not be considered a soldier in the
battle between two competing visions of politics.  It could be taken as
an effort to expose a gap between two visions of politics that needs to
be bridged.  As someone who believes that our environmental laws
are attempts to advance defensible principles and not just self-
interest,75 notwithstanding the argument I have just made, I will
74. See ACKERMAN, supra note 7.
75. See, e.g., Christopher Schroeder, Foreword: A Decade of Change in Regulating the
Chemical Industry, 46 L & C.P. 1 (Summer 1983); Christopher Schroeder, In the Regulation of
Manmade Carcinogens, If Feasibility Analysis Is the Answer, What is the Question? 88 MICH. L.
REV. 1483 (1990) (Review of Frank Cross, Environmentally Induced Cancer and the Law).
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conclude with a few notes on what that bridge building project might
look like.
In some crucial respects, proponents of deliberative democracy
need self-interest to motivate citizens to action in the first place.  It is
doubtful that any significant social movement in the United States
has ever succeeded without a core constituency that was responding
to a personal sense of grievance.76  Even the drafting of the
Constitution was instigated in circumstances in which substantial
factions within the country had self-interested reasons for changing
the Articles of Confederation.
Grievance alone cannot justify government intervention for
deliberative democrats.  However, the concession that self-interest is
a significant motivator of human action is not equivalent to saying
that it alone ends up explaining all political outcomes. More work
needs to be done in trying to understand situations in which self-
interest and principle may be working together to achieve results that
neither could accomplish alone.  There is a saying in politics that it is
a wonderful thing when convenience and principle come together, yet
we do not have very good ways to model mixed motive cases in
politics.
One fashion in which self-interest and principle may work
together in reaching political outcomes is through the interplay of
groups and their entrepreneurs.  As noted earlier, entrepreneurs play
a crucial role in focusing the group’s attention on a specific solution
to their collective dilemma, out of the vast array of solutions that may
be possible. Since debate and dialogue are often important parts of
the formulation process, it may be that deliberation plays its most
significant role in the entrepreneur’s efforts to formulate measures
that promise to have ultimate legislative success.
In any event, deliberative democrats need to sharpen their
understanding of the role of the legislature in their theory.  Too many
discussions of deliberation proceed without clarifying how the
activity identified could possibly occur within a population of 250
million people.  No account is taken of the very small amount of time
people spend informing themselves on matters of public affairs, a
decision perfectly explicable in rational choice terms because most
public actions have marginal or ambiguous effects on personal
76. See, e.g, Schuck, supra note 4, at 569, noting that critics of special interests fail to
“recognize that single-issue groups had produced some of the most important advances in
social justice in American history, such as female suffrage and abolition of slavery.”  To which I
would add the civil rights advances of the 1960s.
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welfare.  Conversely—and returning to a point just made—public
issues that are most likely to gain people’s attention for any period of
time are those that do have an effect on their personal interests.
Indeed, why should anyone, in a society that promotes concern for
self and family as paramount virtues and which suggests in various
ways that no one else will provide anything more than emergency
assistance, expect that individuals would not be preoccupied with
satisfying self-interest?
Plausible theories of deliberative democracy need to account for
the unlikelihood of true, countrywide deliberation by according more
significance to the deliberation that can and should take place in
representative bodies.  Deliberation in representative assemblies
might constitute the mechanism through which self-interested
grievances are “laundered,” to see if they can appropriately be
incorporated into a larger understanding of social norms.77  This, after
all, is approximately the role that the Founding Fathers thought
Congress would fulfill in our representative democracy.78
In short, the pursuit of self-interest seems an inevitable aspect of
political life, and it is hard to believe that we will achieve a firmer
understanding of how legislation is enacted without incorporating it
into our analysis.  At the same time, an approach that finds a place
for both self-interest and principle may turn out to be superior to one
that seeks to eliminate one or the other.79
77. See Robert Goodin, Laundering Preferences, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE
THEORY (J. Elster & A. Hylland ed., 1986) for a discussion of the value of forcing self
interested preferences to be placed in a larger principled framework.
78. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29,
38-48 (1985) (describing Madison’s arguments that civic virtue would reside especially in our
elected representatives).  For a defense of the proposition that deliberation does in fact occur
in national government, especially the Congress, see JOSEPH M BESSETTE, THE MILD VOICE
OF REASON (1994).
79. This concluding section is only intended to be illustrative of ways deliberative
approaches to democratic decisionmaking and interest group approaches might be merged.
For another dimension of this problem, consider the “Bootleggers and Baptists” coalitions
discussed by Bruce Yandle and others.  In such coalitions, those who support policies for
principled reasons combine with those who support them for self-interested reasons.  See, e.g,
BRUCE YANDLE, THE POLITICAL LIMITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: TRACKING THE
UNICORN 25 (1989); Marc Landy & Mary Hague, The Coalition for Waste: Private Interests and
Superfund, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 67 (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr., eds.,
1992) (noting that support by environmentalists and the waste disposal industry make
Superfund reform extremely difficult).
